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SUMMARY 
 
Common law does recognise the concept of dismissal based on operational 
requirements.  It recognises dismissals that are based on breach of expressed or 
implied terms of contract of employment.  The concept of operational requirements 
has its roots in the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.  This Act recognised termination 
of employment of a number of employees due to ability, capacity, productivity, 
conduct and operational requirements and needs of undertaking industry trade or 
occupation of the employer as legitimate. 
 
Under the 1956 LRA, employers were allowed to dismiss employees if employees 
refused to accept the proposed change to conditions of employment.  The dismissal 
is called lock-out dismissal.  This kind of dismissal entitled employers to dismiss 
employees on condition that the dismissal was temporary and the workers would be 
re-employed when they agree to the demands of the employer.  After the contract of 
employment was terminated between the employer and employees, the employer 
was allowed to implement the changes using scab labour. 
 
The 1995 Labour Relations Act introduced section 187(1)(c) that was intended to re-
enforce the abolishing of the lock-out dismissal.  This section strictly forbids the 
dismissal of employees in order to compel them to accept demands of the employer 
in matters of mutual interest.  Such dismissals are regarded as automatically unfair. 
 
In terms of section 64(4) of the 1995 LRA employers are not permitted to unilaterally 
effect changes to employees’ terms and conditions of employment.  They are 
required to seek and obtain consent of the affected employees.  If employees refuse 
to accept the proposed changes, the employer can use lock-out as defence.  Firstly, 
the employer can initiate lock-out until employees accede to its demand.   
 
Secondly, the employer can lock-out employees in response to the notice of strike or 
strike of the employees.  The employer can use scab labour during this lock-out 
period.  Unlike the lock-out dismissal, lock-out under the 1995 LRA does not include 
termination of contract of employment. 
 iv 
 
In contrast, employers are allowed to dismiss employees who refuse to agree to 
change to their terms and conditions of employment on the ground of operational 
requirements provided a fair procedure is followed.  This reason for dismissal is not 
viewed by the courts as a dismissal to induce employees to accept the demand of 
the employer. 
 
The question that this study seeks to examine is the relationship between automatic 
unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act and 
dismissal for operational requirements. 
 
A dispute between the employer and employees regarding change to terms and 
conditions of employment is a mutual interest dispute; and it therefore falls under 
collective bargaining.  The same dispute can easily fall to rights dispute, because the 
reason for the proposed change to the production system and demand to the pursuit 
of improved efficiency and better achievement of profit objective related to 
operational requirement.  There is obvious overlap between operational requirements 
and wage work bargaining. 
 
In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics, the court held that the employer is entitled to 
run its business in a prosperous way and this may entail affecting changes to terms 
and conditions of employment when the market forces demand so. 
 
In Mwasa v Independent Newspapers, the court held that change to terms and 
conditions of service of an employee can be proposed as a way to avoid 
retrenchment; dismissal of employees for refusing to accept the change is not 
covered by section 187(1)(c). 
 
In Fry’s Metals v Numsa, the court has rejected the notion that there is tension 
between section 187(1)(c) and section 188(1)(a)(ii).  The court held that section 
186(1) refers to dismissal or termination of workforce with the intention to end the 
employment contract and replacing the workforce with employees that are prepared 
to accept terms and conditions of employment that suit the employer’s operational 
requirements.  The court argued further that the meaning of dismissal should be a 
 v 
starting point when one wants to dispute the two sections.  On the other hand, 
section 187(1)(c) was effected with a certain purpose, which is to prohibit the 
employer from dismissing employees in order to compel them to accept its demand in 
dispute of mutual interest.  The court held that the dismissal in this case was final.  
The employer dismissed its employees because it did not need them anymore.  This 
dismissal is in accordance with section 186(1).  The court rejected that operational 
requirements is confirmed to saving business from bankruptcy.  The court argued 
that the principle includes measures calculated to increase efficiency and profitability.  
The employer can dismiss and make more profit. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Employers are sometimes compelled for economic reasons to review their work 
method or system.  This may lead to job loss.  Economic reasons may be influenced 
by competitive market forces, efficiency or the employer may want to better its profits.  
Under the circumstances the employer may consider restructuring its organisation.  
Restructuring may mean the introduction of new working system that might lead to 
changing the terms and conditions of employment.  Sometimes, restructuring leads 
to some employees losing their positions in the organisation because their jobs 
become redundant.  Some employers may decide to take a long term view and invest 
heavily on advanced technology requiring fewer employees to control and operate it.  
Again employees lose their jobs.1
Before the employer is able to implement any of the above considerations, the 
employer must first involve employees that are going to be adversely affected by the 
changes and their representative in decision making.  The Labour Relations Act
 
 
2
- Employees may choose to go on strike in order to stop the employer from 
implementing the changes; 
 
(hereinafter “the 1995 LRA”) strictly prohibits introduction of unilateral change.  
According to section 64(4) of the 1995 LRA the following consensus flows from 
unilateral change to the conditions of employment: 
 
 
- If the changes have been effected, employees may request the employer to 
restore the status quo. 
 
When the employer proposes change to the terms and conditions of employment, 
that dispute can be classified as a dispute of mutual interest.  Dispute of mutual 
interest can be negotiated through collective bargaining.  In the event negotiations 
between the parties do not reach agreement stage, the employer cannot unilaterally 
                                                 
1  Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke and Strydom Essential Labour Law (2005) 
146. 
2  66 of 1995. 
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implement the changes or dismiss employees in order to compel them to accept the 
proposed changes.  This kind of dismissal is prohibited by section 187(1)(c) of the 
1995 LRA.  It is regarded as an automatically unfair dismissal. 
 
Under the 1956 LRA employers were allowed to dismiss employees if employees 
refused to accept the proposed changes.  The dismissal is called lock-out dismissal.  
This kind of dismissal entitled employers to dismiss employees on condition that the 
dismissal was temporary and the workers would be re-employed when they agree to 
the demands of the employer.  After the contract of employment was terminated 
between the employer and employees, the employer was allowed to implement the 
changes using scab labour. 
 
The 1995 LRA introduced section 187(1)(c) that was intended to re-enforce the 
abolishing of the lock-out dismissal.  This section strictly forbids the dismissal of 
employees in order to compel them to accept demands of the employer in matters of 
mutual interest.  Such dismissals are regarded as automatically unfair.  Lock-out is 
still an option for employers under the 1995 LRA.  Unlike the lock-out dismissal, lock-
out under the 1995 LRA does not include termination of contract of employment.  
lock-out can only be used to force employees to accede to employer’s demand and it 
falls short of dismissal.3
If employees refuse to accept the proposal of the employer to changes of terms and 
conditions of employment, the employer has three defenses.  First, the employer can 
initiate lock-out.  This means that the employer can lock employees out until they 
accede to its demand.  The employer is not allowed to employ scab labour during the 
lock-out period.  Second, the employer can lock-out employees in response to the 
notice of strike or strike of the employees.  The employer can use scab labour during 
the lock-out period.  Again employees are locked-out until they agree to the 
employer’s demand.  Third, the employer can dismiss employees for operational 
 
 
                                                 
3  Thompson “Bargaining, Business, Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” 
(1999) 20 ILJ 760. 
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requirements.4  The employer must show reasons that are justified and fair for this 
dismissal and a fair procedure must be followed.5
Grogan
 
 
6 argues that a contract of employment ought to be treated in terms of law of 
contract and common law.  According to these laws employees have a legal right to 
accept or reject the proposal of the employer to change of the contract of 
employment.  If the employer decides to unilaterally change the contract of 
employment, the employer will be in breach of contract.  The employee can sue for 
damages or hold the employer to the contract in terms of section 34 of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act7
In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd,
 (hereinafter “the BCEA”).  Section 34 of the BCEA 
allows employees to sue employers and recover lost wages and damages.  The 
employee has a choice to accept or refuse the proposed changes. The question that 
remains to be answered is whether the employer can dismiss employees if 
employees refuse to accept changes to conditions of employment.   
 
Courts had no easy task in trying to determine the precise meaning and effect of 
section 187(1)(c) of 1995 LRA, particularly with regards to right and interests of the 
employer to dismiss workers for fair reason relating to operational requirements as 
opposed to the right and interest of the employee in relation to right to work security 
and under section 187(1)(c). 
 
8
“An employer may not dismiss employees in order to compel acceptance of a 
demand but this does not prevent the employer resorting to dismissal for 
operational requirements in a genuine case.”
 the court held that: 
 
9
The relationship between employer and employee is characterised by inherent 
inequality, with the employer in a very powerful position.  By prohibiting lock-out 
dismissal or any dismissal, the 1995 LRA is attempting to strike a balance between 
the two.  However, an employer is entitled to run its business in a prosperous way 
 
 
                                                 
4  Grogan Workplace Law 8th ed (2004) 434. 
5  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
6  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 420. 
7  75 of 1997. 
8  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC). 
9  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 19. 
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and this may entail effecting change to terms and conditions of employment when the 
market forces demand so.  This is in line with the purpose of the 1995 LRA, which is 
to advance economic development as well as social justice.10
Section 188(1)(a)(ii)
 
 
11 permits employers to dismiss its employees for operational 
requirements.  Section 21312
In MWASA v Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd,
 defines operational requirements as follows: 
 
“As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial 
management of the enterprise, technological reasons refer to new technology 
that affects work relationships, and structural reasons relate to the redundancy of 
posts consequent on the restructuring of the employer’s enterprise.” 
 
Section 188(1)(a)(i) of the 1995 LRA read together with the definition of operational 
requirements mean that even within the context of collective bargaining, where an 
employer wants to change the terms and conditions of employment and employees 
refuse to accept the new conditions, the employer may dismiss employees for 
operational requirements; subject to the condition that a fair procedure is followed 
and there exist a justified and reasonable ground for the dismissal. 
 
13
                                                 
10  S 1. 
11  1995 Labour Relations Act. 
12  Ibid. 
13  (2002) 23 ILJ 918 (LC). 
 the court held that if change to 
conditions of service of employees is proposed as a way of avoiding retrenchment, 
dismissal of employees for refusing to accept the change is not covered by section 
187(1)(c).   
 
Cheadle argues that: 
 
“Section 187(1)(c) makes classic lock-out dismissal automatically unfair.  An 
employer may no longer dismiss employees to compel them to accept how 
different is that from dismissing an employee on grounds of operational 
requirements because the employer needs to change terms and conditions of 
employment and the employee refused to agree to it.” 
 
 5 
This is precisely the question that Landman J grapples with in South African 
Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd.14  He recognised that the purpose is the same - 
to change terms and conditions of employment.  The reason for changing terms and 
conditions of employment is the same - operational requirements.  He suggested 
somewhat differently, that the difference may live in the procedure to be adopted in 
effecting the dismissal - an operational requirement dismissal has to follow a detailed 
procedure.  But if the reason (compelling an employer to accept new terms and 
conditions), is automatically unfair, then complying with section 189 cannot transform 
into a fair one.15
Todd and Damant
 
 
16
In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd,
 argue the same point differently.  They argue that there is no 
conceptual distinction that can be properly drawn between the subject matter of 
collective bargaining and the subject matter of retrenchment consultation, and there 
is no proper distinction that can be maintained in the two processes.  Both disputes 
of collective bargaining and retrenchment can be discussed in the same process.  All 
of these matters relate to wage-work bargaining.  The employer’s operational 
requirements are the only instrument to measure the difference.  The final decision 
on the viability of the business entity is the managers’ prerogative.  Managers are 
said to have exclusive managerial prerogative, because it is them that are vested 
with knowledge and expertise of running a business.   
 
17 the Labour Appeal Court 
reiterated that “the enquiry is one which would have been chosen by the court … the 
courts should be slow to interfere to direct those decisions”.  The question that the 
court still had to deal with is the distinction between the context of changing terms 
and conditions of employment dismissal that is meant to compel employees to accept 
new terms and conditions of employment falling within section 187(1)(c), and that 
which is based on operational requirements.  However, the Labour Appeal Court in 
Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa,18
                                                 
14  (1998) 19 ILJ 62 (LC) at 67. 
15  Cheadle, Le Roux, Thompson and Van Niekerk Current Labour Law (1998) 26. 
16  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” (2004) 25 ILJ 896 at 915. 
17  (1998) 19 ILJ 62 (LC). 
18  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
 has 
rejected the notion that there is tension between the two sections.   
 6 
 
In Fry’s Metals, the court rejected Thompson’s migration approach.  The court argued 
that there is a distinction between the meaning of section 186(1) and section 
187(1)(c).  Section 186(1) refers to dismissal or termination of workforce with the 
intention ending the employment contract and replacing the workforce with 
employees that are prepared to accept terms and conditions of employment that suit 
the employer’s operational requirements.  The court argued further that the meaning 
of dismissal should be the starting point when one wants to dispute the two sections.  
On the other hand, section 187(1)(c) was effected with a certain purpose; which is, to 
prohibit the employer from dismissing employees in order to compel them to accept 
its demand in dispute of mutual interest.  The court held that the dismissal in this 
case was final.  The employer dismissed the employee without conditions or promise 
of re-employment.  The employer dismissed its employees because it did not need 
them anymore.  This dismissal was in accordance with section 186(1). 
 
In Algorax,19
Todd and Damant argue that section 187(1)(c) does not purport to prohibit a 
dismissal where the reason for the dismissal is the failure of employees to accept a 
change to their conditions of employment.  This section does not prohibit threat of 
dismissal as a means of persuasion in the collective bargaining process.  This 
section prohibits a dismissal where the reason for the dismissal is to compel 
employees to accept a collective bargaining demand.  “Collective bargaining conduct 
may, it seems, be calculated to induce (through force of argument) acceptance of a 
demand; but nevertheless fall short of an attempt to compel that acceptance.”
 by contrast, Algorax repeatedly offered those employees who were 
dismissed re-employment.   
 
The court said the employer’s conduct was automatically unfair, because its conduct 
was in the realm of the lock-out dismissal.  The effect of prohibiting the lock-out 
dismissal is to signal to employers that the decision to retrench may be made only at 
the point at which it is clear that no form of persuasion is likely to come from the 
employer.   
 
20
                                                 
19  CWIU v Algorax (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
20   Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 1916. 
  The 
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line is crossed only where a party in the collective bargaining process attempts to 
compel acceptance of a demand by definition involves some action designed to force 
the other party’s had.  That is the action that goes beyond persuasion such as lock-
out or dismissal. 
 
In Hendry v Adcock Ingrams,21
In this treatise the focus will be more on the relationship between section 187(1)(c) 
and discussion based on operational requirements.  Chapter two deals with 
automatically unfair dismissals in terms of section 187(1)(c).  In Chapter three 
dismissal for operational requirements is discussed.  Chapter four will deal with the 
test for substantive fairness and the role of the court in determining the fairness of 
dismissals that are based on operational requirements.  Chapter five deals with the 
critical analysis of the relationship between dismissal for operational requirements 
and collective bargaining.  Chapter six provides a conclusion and recommendations. 
 the court allowed a retrenchment for profit.  The court 
argued that if the employer is able to show that a good profit is to be made in 
accordance with sound economic rationale, and a fair procedure was followed during 
the retrenchment process, the employer can dismiss.   
 
In Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, the court confirmed 
retrenchment for profit.  The court argued that the principle ‘operational requirements’ 
is not confined to saving business from bankruptcy, but it includes measures 
calculated to increase efficiency and profitability.  The employer can dismiss and 
make more profit. 
 
                                                 
21  (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC). 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTOMATICALLY UNFAIR DISMISSALS IN TERMS OF SECTION 
187(1)(c) 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 187(1)(c) originates from the 1956 LRA’s definition of lock-out.  According to 
this Act, lock-out definition permitted the use of conditional dismissal as a tool of 
compulsion during the collective bargaining process.  The employer was allowed to 
temporarily dismiss employees who refused to accept the employer’s demand during 
collective bargaining process on condition that they would be re-employed when they 
acceded to the demand of the employer. 
 
Section 187(1)(c) is intended to reinforce the abolition of the lock-out dismissal.  
Unlike the definition of local dismissal, lock-out definition under 1995 LRA does not 
include the termination of contract of the employee concerned.  Lock-out under the 
1995 LRA falls short of dismissal.22  Employers may chose to invoke offensive lock-
out or defensive lock-out at the point of impasse in an attempt to force the employee 
to accept its demand.  Offensive lock-out refers to a lock-out that is initiated by the 
employer.  The employer is not allowed to make use of replacement labour.23
                                                 
22   Grogan Workplace Law 434. 
23   S 76(1)(b). 
  
Defensive lock-out refers to a lock-out that is in response to the notice of strike or 
strike by the employees.  During this lock-out the employer is allowed to use scab 
labour. 
 
2.2 LOCK-OUT DISMISSAL (under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956) 
 
Lock-out means any one or more of the following acts or omissions by a person who 
is or has been an employer. 
 
 9 
(a) The exclusion by him of anybody or a number of persons who are or have been 
in his employ from any premises on or in which work provided by him is or has 
been performed, or 
 
(b) total or partial discontinuance by him of his business or of the provision of work; 
or  
 
(c) the breach or termination by him of the contracts of employment of anybody or 
number of persons in his employ; or 
 
(d) the refusal or failure by him to re-employ anybody who has been in his employ, 
if the purpose of that exclusion, discontinuance, breach, termination, refusal, or 
failure is to induce or compel any person, who is or has been in his employ or in 
the employ of other persons; or 
 
(e) to agree to or comply with any demands or proposals concerning terms and 
conditions of employment or other matters made by him or on his behalf or on 
behalf of any other person who is or has been an employer; or 
 
(f) to accept any change in terms of conditions of employment; or 
 
(g) to agree to the employment or the suspension or termination of the employment 
of any person.24
 
The above definition means that employers were allowed to introduce change 
unilaterally to terms and conditions of employment of their employees through 
termination lock-out option.   
 
 
The requirement for a legal lock-out dismissal was that the dismissal has to have a 
purpose and also be conditional.  The employer was allowed to use lock-out 
dismissal in the context of collective bargaining.  Lock-out dismissal was intended to 
compel employees to accept demands of the employer that were related to disputes 
                                                 
24  S 1(a)-(d). 
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of mutual interest.  The dismissals were conditional.  The condition was that 
employees were dismissed until they accepted to the demands of employers.  Lock-
out dismissals were not designed to be final.  Lock-out dismissal that was made final 
was declared unlawful.  Lock-out dismissals were allowed, provided that the 
employer had a reasonable business rationale. The employer must have negotiated 
with the employees or their representatives in good faith to deadlock on the issue 
and must have given a reasonable notice to the employees.25
In K Ngubane v NTE Limited
   
 
26
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Eveready SA (Pty) Ltd
 the court observed and noted that the requirement is 
that the old contract of employment must be terminated with the purpose of inducing 
acceptance of a demand or proposal, or the employer can simultaneously terminate 
the contract of employment and give the employee his final offer.  The offer must 
remain open for acceptance for a specific time or an indefinite time.  If the offer is 
indefinite it would lapse when it is withdrawn.  Although termination of employment is 
final by its nature, the lock-out ends when the offer of re-employment expires. 
 
27 the court 
confirmed that conditional termination of employment constituted a lock-out in terms 
of the 1956 LRA.28
In Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa v Game Discount 
World Ltd
  The court confirmed that dismissal of employees coupled with an 
offer to re-employ if the offer was accepted was in line with the requirements of lock-
out dismissal.  Lock-out dismissals were designed to be temporary coupled with the 
offer of re-employment upon acceptance of the offer.  If a dismissal was not coupled 
with the offer of re-employment, such dismissals were declared unlawful and outside 
the ambit of lock-out dismissal definition. 
 
29
                                                 
25  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 910. 
26  (1990) 1 (10) SALLR 11 (IC). 
27  (1990) 11 ILJ 338 (IC). 
28  S 65(d)(i)–(ii). 
29  (1990) 11 ILJ 162 (IC). 
 the employer failed to reach an agreement in negotiations about wages 
and other terms and conditions of employment.  The employer dismissed employees.  
The dismissals were final and irrevocable.  The court held that the dismissals fell 
outside the ambit of lock-out definition and were therefore unlawful. 
 11 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aerial King Sales (Pty) Ltd30
“There is, however, nothing in the Act that suggests that para (c) of the definition 
of a lock-out permits an employer to use the lock-out as a weapon to achieve a 
valid final dismissal of its employees.  To dismiss employees because they do 
not want to accept management’s final offer on wages cannot constitute a valid 
reason for dismissal.”
 the 
employer dismissed employees for rejecting a final wage offer.  The court 
emphasised the importance of the prohibition of the final dismissal within the context 
of collective bargaining as follows: 
 
31
Section 213
 
 
2.3 LOCK-OUT (under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995) 
 
32
Section 187(1)(c)
 defines a lock-out as follows: 
 
“The exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer’s workplace, for 
the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any 
matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the 
employer breaches those employees’ contracts of employment in the course of 
or for the purpose of that exclusion.” 
 
As opposed to the 1956 LRA, the 1995 LRA appears to want to regulate the situation 
of its predecessor in a different way.  The 1995 LRA prohibits termination of 
employees’ contracts of employment, whether the termination is conditional or final, 
as a way of inducing compliance with the employer’s demand in the context of 
collective bargaining.  Employers are only allowed to physically exclude employees 
from its premises as a way of compelling them to accept its demands in any matter of 
mutual interest.  Lock-out under the current Act must be short of dismissal. 
 
2.4 SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
33
                                                 
30  (1994) 15 ILJ 1384 (IC). 
31  (1994) 15 ILJ 1384 (IC) at 1393. 
32  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
33  1995 Labour Relations Act. 
 states: 
 
 12 
“(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the 
employees, acts contrary to section 5, or, if the reason for the dismissal is –  
 
(c)  to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter 
of mutual interest between the employer and employee.” 
 
This section is aimed at preventing employers from resorting to lock-out dismissals 
when they cannot get their way in collective bargaining processes.  According to this 
section the employers may not threaten employees with disciplinary action if 
employees refuse to accept the demand of the employer. 
 
In the past the Labour Court was faced with a challenge about the meaning of 
section 187(1)(c) in situations in which employees were threatened with dismissal or 
actual dismissal for refusing to accept unilateral change to their conditions of 
employment by their employer. 
 
Schoeman v Samsung Electronic (Pty) Ltd34
“The employer in the private sector needs to be able to survive and prosper 
economically.  To do this the employer must meet changed market 
circumstances and be competitive.  To meet the changes of the market 
adaptations are required.  An employer needs the flexibility to deploy, reasonably 
quickly and efficiently, the resources at the employer’s disposal.  The employer 
 concerns two sales executives who 
were paid a salary package consisting of basic salary, commission and fringe 
benefits.  As a result of company restructuring exercise there was a substantial 
increase in sales volume that was not related to improvement in their own 
performance.  The two executive began to earn large amounts of commission that 
anticipated when the basis for the calculation of commission had been agreed.  The 
employer decided that the amounts of the commission payments were not justified 
when the employer calculated what the company would have to pay in the market to 
replace them.  Negotiation between these employees and their employer 
deadlocked.  The employer attempted unsuccessfully to lock them out in an attempt 
to persuade them to accept a lower commission.  The employer decided to embark 
on retrenchment consultations and ultimately dismissed them. 
 
The Labour Court ruled that: 
 
                                                 
34  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC). 
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has various options open to him to achieve this.  One of them is the lock-out 
route which is used to compel acceptance of a demand.”35
The court went further and said an employer may not dismiss employees in order to 
compel acceptance of a demand.  The employer could have opted for dismissal for 
operational requirements.  In the opinion of the court dismissal for operational 
requirements could be used not only in relation to an employer’s need for change to 
work obligation but also the remuneration of an employee.
 
 
36
In ECCAWUSA v Shoprite Checkers t/a OK Bazaars Krugersdorp
 
 
37
In MWASA v Independent Newspaper (Pty) Ltd
 the employer 
was under financial collapse before the business could be sold to Shoprite group as 
a going concern.  OK Bazaars Krugersdorp began consulting with its worker’s union.  
Agreement was reached that both parties would take all reasonable measures to 
avoid job losses.  OK Bazaars Krugersdorp and the union also agreed that flexible 
work practices were an important component of this plan in order to avoid job losses.  
Subsequent to the agreement with the union the employer introduced new and more 
economical shift pattern.  Employees refused to accept the new shift patterns.  The 
employer retrenched them. 
 
The court found that the new shift patterns were introduced as alternative to 
retrenchment.  Amendment to terms and conditions of employment can be preferred 
as an alternative to retrenchment.  OK Bazaars Krugersdorp was justified in 
dismissing employees who refused to accept the alternative on offer. 
 
38 the company had placed its 
editorial employees in a pool and required them to work for all its publications, 
instead of only one publication as before.  Employees rejected the offer of the 
company and they were retrenched.  The court held that the dismissal of employees 
who refused to accept of the company was fair.  The Labour Court adopted a 
different approach in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s (Pty) 
Ltd.39
                                                 
35  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 18-19. 
36  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 911-912. 
37  (2000) 21 ILJ 1347 (LC). 
38  (2002) 23 ILJ 918 (LC). 
39  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC). 
  The employer bargained with the union in an attempt to secure an agreement 
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to introduce a new shift pattern, but negotiations between the parties failed.  The 
employer threatened to dismiss the employee if they refused to accept the new shift 
pattern. 
 
The court held that dismissal was not a legitimate instrument coercion in the 
collective bargaining process.  The court made reference to the definition of lock-out.  
The court argued that lock-out under the 1995 LRA means that tactical dismissals 
are precluded.  Section 187(1)(c) renders any dismissal to compel acceptance of an 
employment demand automatically unfair.  Wage-work deal must be the product of 
methods stopping short of dismissal.40
In NCBAWU v Hernic Premier Refractories (Pty) Ltd
 
 
41 the company retrenched its 
employees because they refused to accept changed conditions of employment offer, 
after the company had taken over the business of their former employer.  The court 
held that retrenchment could not have been the true reason for their dismissal, as the 
employee had been replaced with contract workers.  The only conclusion that was 
plausible was that the retrenchment was caused by the employee’s refusal to accept 
the demand of the employer.  The court said the dismissal was automatically unfair.  
However, in Fry’s Metals and Hernie Premier Refractories, Grogan argues that the 
Labour Court was persuaded that the employer threatened employees with dismissal 
in order to avoid a lock-out.42
This debate took a different angle and conclusion in the appeal against the Fry’s 
Metals judgment.
    
 
The employer bargained with the union in an attempt to secure an agreement to 
introduce a new shift pattern.  Negotiations between the parties failed.  The employer 
threatened to dismiss the employee if they refused to accept the new shift pattern. 
 
43
                                                 
40  Grogan Workplace Law 143. 
41  (2003) 24 ILJ 837 (LC). 
42  Grogan Workplace Law 143. 
43  Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
  The Labour Appeal Court held that there were two issues that 
were raised in the appeal.  The first issue was whether an employer has a right to 
dismiss employees who were not prepared to agree to changes to their terms and 
conditions of employment.  The second issue was, the nature of the relation between 
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that right and the employee right not to be dismissed for the purpose of being 
compelled to agree to a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest.   
 
The court raised that operational requirement is one of the ground that the 1995 LRA 
provides for dismissal.  Section 187(1)(c) was an attempt to resolve the debate over 
termination lock-out under the 1956 LRA.   
 
Under the 1956 LRA, it had been correctly held that a final and irrevocable dismissal 
did not constitute a lock-out because the dismissal was not aimed at inducing the 
employee to accept a demand.  Once a dismissal is final, the dismissal is not a lock-
out dismissal.  According to the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals judgment the 
reasoning in the 1956 LRA applies equally to section 187(1)(c).  A final dismissal 
purpose is to get rid of the dismissed employees and replace them with the new 
employees who are willing to work according to the new structure of the employer.  
This kind of dismissal is retrenchment.  The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
upheld this decision.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal of the National 
Union of Metalworkers without giving reasons. 
 
The court in Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers44
                                                 
44  (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
 confirmed the 
dismissal of employees who refused to accept the proposal of the employer.  In this 
case, the employer proposed the closure of the hostel where employees were 
residing, the discontinuation of the feeding scheme and wanted to covert its 
employees into independent contractors who would be self employed.  This would 
cause the employees to work at basic wages and on incentive system that would be 
based on productivity.  The employees showed willingness to accept the proposal 
concerning the closure of the hostel and abolition of the feeding scheme.  They 
rejected the proposal of becoming independent contractors or incentive employees. 
The employer dismissed the employees on operational grounds.  The court held that 
because the dismissal was final and irrevocable it fell outside the ambit of section 
187(1)(c). 
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In Chemical Workers Industries Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd45
In circumstances where employees are locked out or are on a legal strike, the 
employer is not precluded from dismissing them for operational requirements or 
disciplining them for misconduct.  South African Chemical Workers Union v Algorax 
Ltd
 employees were 
dismissed for refusal to work a new shift system.  The employer tried in vain to 
persuade them to change their minds before the ultimate dismissal.  Unlike in Fry’s 
Metals, Algorax offered to re-employ the dismissed workers if they were willing to 
work the new shift system, and kept that offer open until the matter reached the 
Labour Court.   The court found that the dismissal was only procedurally unfair.  The 
union appealed the decision of the Labour Court, that stated that the dismissal was 
not automatically or substantively unfair.  The Appeal Court in Chemical Workers 
Industries Union v Algorax held that the employer had infringed on section 187(1)(c) 
because it offered to reinstate the employees after dismissing them.  Algorax did not 
formally declare a lock-out.  If the lock-out was declared the employer would have 
kept the employees outside as long as it did without compensating them for unfair 
dismissal.  The court reinstated the employees with compensation of the full period 
that they were locked out. 
 
46
                                                 
45  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
46  (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LC). 
 illustrates this point more clearly.  The employer had a distribution system that 
resulted in its drivers working in excess of overtime permitted by law.  The employer 
decided to introduce a staggered shift system to overcome the problem.  Drivers 
embarked on a strike, but subsequently succumbed to the change.  Five months later 
employees, at one of the employer’s branches decided to embark on a strike action 
again, demanding that the staggered shift system be abandoned.   The employer 
responded by locking them out and informing their union that the striking employees 
would be retrenched.  Employees at the other branches embarked on a solidarity 
strike in support of the threatened drivers.  The employer retrenched the strikers.  
The union claimed that the dismissal was automatically unfair.  The Labour Appeal 
Court held that the dismissal had been effected for operational requirements. 
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The 1995 LRA allows employers to dismiss employees for a fair reason relating to 
the employee’s conduct, capacity or operational requirements.47  In Slagment (Pty) 
Ltd v Building Construction & Allied Workers Union48
In A Mauchle (Pty) Ltd t/a Precision Tools v National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa
 two employees refused to work 
under a newly appointed supervisor and were dismissed after several warnings.   
 
49
The common law interpretation of the onus is that “he who asserts must prove”.  
Section 192 of the 1995 LRA set the general rule on the onus of proof.  This section 
provides that in dismissal proceedings the employee must establish the existence of 
the dismissal whereafter the employer must prove that the dismissal is fair.
 employees were dismissed after they refused to operate two machines 
instead of one for a limited period.  In both cases the court held that the employer’s 
instructions were reasonable and fair.  The employees were contractually obliged to 
perform the work demanded of them.  The actions of the employees constituted 
insubordination.  Although both of these cases were decided under the 1956 LRA, 
the reasoning adopted in them is till relevant to establish boundaries of section 
187(1)(c). 
 
2.5 ONUS OF PROOF 
 
50  
However, in automatically unfair dismissals, the employee rests with the onus to 
prove the dismissal and that the dismissal is automatically unfair.  The employee is 
required to provide prima facie evidence in support of his allegation.  If it is proved 
that an employee was dismissed on automatically unfair grounds listed in section 
187, it is not open to the employer to show that the dismissal was fair.  The 
proceedings must directly consider the remedy to which the employee is entitled.51  
In Jada v First National Bank52
                                                 
47  Ss 67(5) and 188. 
48  (1994) 15 ILJ 979 (A). 
49  (1995) 16 ILJ 349 (LAC). 
50  Cohen “Onus of Proof in Automatically Unfair Dismissals – Jada v First National Bank” (2006) 
27 ILJ 2627 (LC); (2007) ILJ 1465. 
51  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smith and Van Eck Law@Work (2008) 220. 
52  (2006) 27 ILJ 2627 (LC). 
 the employee was dismissed for misconduct.  He 
alleged that he was victimised and dismissed because of his trade union activities, 
and discriminated against because of his race.  The court considered whether the 
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employee had a duty to adduce prima facie evidence of the automatically unfair 
dismissal.  The court adopted Mashada v Cuzen & Woods Attorney53 approach that 
held that “if an employee alleges that he was dismissed for prohibited grounds eg 
pregnancy, then it would seem that the employee must in addition to making the 
allegation at least prove that the employer was aware that the employee was 
pregnant and that the dismissal was possibly on this ground”.54  The court in 
Kroukam v SA Airlinks55
With this background, it is clear that section 187(1)(c) prevents dismissals that are 
meant to compel employees to accept the employer’s demand on matter of mutual 
interest, but it does not prevent employers from dismissing employees who refuse to 
accept a demand if the effect of that dismissal is to save other workers from 
retrenchment, nor does it preclude employers from dismissing grossly insubordinate 
employees.  The onus of proof under automatically unfair dismissal requires the 
 concluded that in providing the onus the employee does not 
need to prove anything.  The employee is only required to raise doubts about the 
reason for dismissal. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 LRA is intended to end the debate over whether 
employer may fairly dismiss employees pursuant to lock-outs.  In terms of this section 
dismissals are deemed to be automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is to 
compel employees to accept a demand in respect of any dispute of mutual interest 
between employer and employee.  Under both 1956 and 1995 LRA employers have 
a remedy to lock-out employees at the point where negotiations have reached 
impasse.  Under the 1956 LRA, the employer was allowed to use a lock-out dismissal 
to pressure or induce employees to accept its demand.  Lock-out dismissal had to be 
coupled with re-employment option at the point of acceptance of the employer’s 
demand.  Under the 1995 LRA lock-out does not include termination of contracts of 
employees.  This type of lock-out allows the employer only to exclude employees 
from entering its premises until they accede to its demand. 
 
                                                 
53  (2000) 21 ILJ 402 (LC). 
54  Cohen “Onus of Proof in Automatically Unfair Dismissals – Jada v First National Bank” 1466. 
55  (2005) 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). 
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employee to cast doubt about the reason for dismissal as opposed to proof on 
balance of probability that is required in terms of section 192.  Chapter three deals 
with dismissal for operational requirements. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISMISSAL FOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Employers are seldom compelled for a wide variety of economic reasons to review or 
consider reducing its wage bill by terminating the employment of some of their 
employees.  The common scenario is that, the employer may consider restructuring 
its organisation.  Restructuring may mean introducing new working systems that 
might lead to change of terms and conditions of employments.  Sometimes, because 
of restructuring some employees lose their positions in the organisation because 
their job becomes redundant.  Some employers might decide to take a long term 
view and invest heavily on advanced technology requiring fewer employees to control 
and operate this technology.  Again employees loose their jobs.56
This kind of dismissal is called dismissal for operational requirements and commonly 
known as retrenchment or no fault dismissal.
 
 
57  Dismissal for operational 
requirements is one of the three grounds of termination of employment that is 
recognised by the 1995 LRA58 which might be legitimate.  Retrenchment becomes 
legitimate provided the employer can show that the dismissal is fair and justified and 
a fair procedure was followed.59  Dismissal for operational requirements are 
regulated in section 189 and 189A respectively.60
                                                 
56  Basson Essential Labour Law 146. 
57  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practice 361. 
58  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
59  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles and Bosch and Rossouw Labour Relations 
Law – A Comprehensive Guide 5th ed (2006) 394. 
60  1995 Labour Relations Act. 
 
 
3.2 MEANING OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
Section 213 of the 1995 LRA define operational requirements as follows: 
 
“Operational requirements means requirements based on the economic, 
technological, structural or similar needs of an employer.” 
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Both the term operational requirements and its definition are drawn from the 
International Labour Organisation Convention 158. 
 
“Article 4 of the Convention recognises a valid reason based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or services as a legitimate 
justification for dismissal.  Article 13 of the Convention imposes specific 
obligations on employers who contemplate terminations for reasons of an 
economic, technological, structural or similar nature.  The Convention provides 
little further guidance as to precisely what reasons are contemplated by this 
provision.  The recommendation that accompanies the Convention (Termination 
of Employment Recommendation No. 66 of 1982) refers to consultation with 
workers’ representatives when an employer contemplates the introduction of 
major changes in production, programme organisation, structure or technology 
that are likely to entail termination.”61
The Code of Good Practice on Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements
 
 
62 
notes that there is difficulty in defining all the circumstances that might legitimately 
form the basis of a dismissal in these circumstances.63
The Code
 
 
64
Van Niekerk argues that the definition of operational requirements is expansive.  
Over the years the courts have included dismissal for incapacity, refusal to accept 
the change to conditions of employment consequent upon the need to reorganise 
work as well as dismissal at the behest of third party.
 gives guidance to the interpretation of section 213 as follows: 
 
“As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial 
management of the enterprise, technological reasons refer to new technology 
that affects work relationships, and structural reasons relate to the reducing of 
posts consequent on the restructuring of the employers enterprise.” 
 
65
This definition refers to four categories of operations requirements; namely the 
employer’s economic needs, technological need, structural or similar need.  This 
definition clearly demonstrates that the reason for the dismissal does not relate to the 
employee, but to the needs of the employer.
 
 
66
                                                 
61  Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 270. 
62  GN 1517 in GG 202554, dated 16 July 1999. 
63  Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 271. 
64  Schedule 8 Labour Relations Act 1995. 
65  Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 271. 
66  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 146. 
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Grogan interprets this definition as follows: 
 
“Economic need for example include those needs and requirements relating to 
the economic well being of the enterprise.”67
                                                 
67  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 147. 
 
 
Technological need refers to the introduction of new technology, such as more 
advanced machinery, mechanisation or computerisation that leads to the redundancy 
of employees. 
 
Structural needs as a reason for the dismissal of employees refers to posts becoming 
redundant following a restructuring of the enterprise.  Restructuring often follows 
upon a merger or an amalgamation between two or more businesses. 
 
3.2.1 THE EMPLOYER’S SIMILAR NEEDS 
 
Similar needs is a very broad concept.  It is not possible to compile a full and 
exhaustive list of what would constitute similar reasons.  Each case might be treated 
with reference to its own circumstances.  There seem to be no dividing line between 
en employer’s economic needs and similar needs. 
 
3.2.1.1 CHANGE TO AN EMPLOYEE’S TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
Because of economic and other business difficulties, a business may need to be 
restructured.  I may merge or amalgamate with another enterprise, change 
operations in order to ensure its survival or competitiveness or to enable to keep 
abreast of the latest developments in the industry.  These changes might lead to 
retrenchment due to redundancy or employees might be offered new positions with 
changes to the terms and conditions of their employment.  Employees that 
unreasonably refuse to accept the changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment may be faced with dismissal due to operational requirements. 
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The courts have been emphasising this point in various judgments.  In WL Oschse 
Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermuelen68
“Any successful business needs contented employees.  Unhappiness can lead to 
problems such as labour unrest, a drop in productivity, and the like.  The 
appellant (the employer) sought to address the unhappiness of the majority of its 
employees with the old remuneration structure, by seeking ways to change it … 
The evidence on record does not establish an ulterior motive on the part of the 
appellant for attempting to find a new remuneration package.  A commercial 
rationale for the changes was thus established.”
 the employee was a tomato salesman for 
the employer.  He was earning more than the other employees as the sale of 
tomatoes attracted a higher commission than the sale of the vegetable sold by the 
other employees.  
 
This caused dissatisfaction among other employees.  The employer tried to address 
the issue by proposing a new remuneration system.  The salesman was given three 
alternatives.  He could either accept the new system or present an alternative system 
or resign.  He proposed that the old system be retained.  When his proposal was 
rejected by the employer he resigned.  The Labour Appeal Court held that the 
employer had not acted unfairly.  The court’s argument was that: 
 
69
In Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v Nation Union of MetalWorkers of South Africa,
 
 
70
When they agree to the change, the dismissal ceases because it has served its 
purpose … he purpose of a dismissal for operational requirements  … is to get 
rid of employees who do not meet the business requirements of the employer so 
that new employees who will meet the business requirements of the employer 
can be employed.”
 the court 
explained the difference between a lock-out dismissal and a dismissal for operational 
requirements as follows: 
 
“A lock-out dismissal entails that the employer wants his existing employee to 
agree to a change of their terms and conditions of employment.  In a lock-out 
dismissal the employer would take the attitude that, if the employee does not 
agree to the proposed changes he would dismiss them – not for operational 
requirements but to compel them to agree to the change.  In such a case the 
employees thereafter would have an opportunity to agree to the changed working 
conditions. 
 
71
                                                 
68  (1997) 18 ILJ 361 (LAC). 
69  WL Oschse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermuelen (1997) 18 ILJ 361 (LAC) at 366. 
70  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
71  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at 146 – 147. 
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In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd72
In Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers
 the merits of this case are 
essentially similar to Fry’s Metals.  The Labour Appeal Court took a different outcome 
to that of Fry’s Metals.  The court pointed out the fundamental difference between an 
operational requirements dismissal as envisaged by section 187(1)(c) the 1995 LRA.  
The court said the difference between the two sections lies in the reason for the 
dismissal.  The court found that Algorax willingness to keep the offer of re-
employment open was enough to distinguish the two cases.  Fry’s Metals could not 
possibly have been intended to compel its employees to accept the new shift system 
after it had dismissed the employees finally and irrevocably.  However, Algorax’s 
actions amounted to lock-out dismissal, which is prohibited by section 187(1)(c) of 
the 1995 LRA. 
 
73
                                                 
72  (2004) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at 1929. 
73  (2007) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
 the employer suffered 
increased competition and engaged with the union for a long period without success.  
Eventually the employer decided to embark on retrenchment exercise for operational 
requirements.   
 
The Labour Appeal Court held that the employer intended to terminate the contract of 
employment of its employees, so that the employees would become independent 
contractors.  The court held that the dismissal was not temporary, which the 
employer would withdraw if the employees accepted the change.  The court upheld 
the dismissal of the employees and rejected the argument of their union that says the 
dismissal fell within the ambit of section 187(1)(c). 
 
The change in terms and conditions of employment is not always as a result of the 
changes regarding the business.  Change can be brought about by certain 
circumstances or attitude of the employees that could have caused serious 
repercussions for the business of the employer.   
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In Steel, Engineering & Allied Workers Union of South Africa v Trident Steel (Pty) 
Ltd74
In Erasmus v BB Bread Ltd
 there was no provision in the contract of service that employees would work 
overtime as and when the operational needs of the business so required it.  
Employees declared an overtime ban in pursuit of their wage demand.  The employer 
dismissed its employees for operational requirements.  The employer argued that 
overtime was essential to its business operations, and working of overtime permitted 
it to offer a 24 hour service, which enabled it to retain its market share in a highly 
competitive field.   
 
The court deemed it unnecessary to consider whether an implied term to work 
overtime existed.  It rather concentrated on wider employment relationship which 
existed between the parties.  The court held that the employees were dismissed for 
valid operational reasons since the business required workers who were prepared to 
work according to business needs. 
 
3.2.1.2 INCOMPATIBILITY AND RELATED REASONS 
 
The courts has established and confirmed that an employee whose actions 
negatively affect the operations of business, could be dismissed for operational 
requirements.  This situation could be presented by the actions of the employee who 
creates disharmony amongst co-workers. 
 
75
In East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd v UPUSA
 employees demanded dismissal of a manager for his 
negative attitude and his derogatory remarks towards black employees.  The 
dismissal was upheld by the court. “The court held that the employer had a right to 
insist on reasonable harmonious interpersonal relationships between employees. 
 
76
                                                 
74  (1986) 7 ILJ 86 (IC). 
75  (1987) 8 ILJ 537 (IC). 
76  (1997) 1 BLLR 10 (LAC). 
 the employer dismissed a number of 
Zulu speaking workers for a violent clash between them and other workers belonging 
to other ethnic group.  The court acknowledged that the dismissal was unfair under 
the circumstances, because it had the element of arbitrary ground.  However, the 
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court found the employer to have dismissed employees fairly, because the employer 
is charged with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of other employees.  
Dismissal was the only option available for the employer. 
 
3.2.1.3 BREAKDOWN IN THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
 
Employees have a common law duty to act in good faith towards their employers.  
The relationship between the employer and the employee is that of trust.   
 
Trust, from the employer’s perspective, entails the belief or confidence, that the 
employee is complying to the common-law duty to act in good faith towards the 
employer and business. 
 
If it can be established by facts on balance of probabilities that this duty has been 
breached, the employee is guilty of misconduct.  If the employer is unable to prove 
the misconduct, the employer may dismiss the employee for operational 
requirements. 
 
The above discussion has been decided by the industrial court in terms of the 1956 
LRA.  In Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, Gallant v CIM77 the employer dismissed three of its 
employees on the basis of suspected theft and its operational requirements.  The 
Industrial Court disputed the dismissal and held that an employer cannot dismiss an 
employee on the mere suspicion of theft.  The court in Census Tseko Moletsane v 
Ascot Diamonds (Pty) Ltd78
In Food & Allied Workers Union v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd
 held that the employer’s dismissal of an employee on 
suspicion of theft has been fair.   
 
79
                                                 
77  (1986) 7 ILJ 346 (IC). 
78  (1993) 2 ICD 310 (IC). 
79  (1994) 15 ILJ 630 (IC). 
 the court 
accepted that the dismissal of a number of employees on suspicion of assault had an 
operational rationale to it.    
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In Chauke v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors80
The concept of operational requirements has its roots in the 1956 LRA.  The 
definition of which is expansive, because dismissal on the ground of operational 
requirements differ depending on the merits of each case.  The definition of 
operational requirements is open-ended because similar needs may include any 
reason.  Under the 1995 LRA, dismissal for operational requirements is permissible 
where employees refuse to accept changes to terms and conditions of employment 
in the course of negotiations.
 the employer could not 
identify employees who were involved in certain incidents of malicious damage to 
property and sabotage.   
 
The Labour Appeal Court held that the employer may dismiss employees for 
operational requirements where dismissals are necessary to save the life of the 
enterprise. 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
81  Brassey argues that the employer must have 
negotiated to impasse first, then they can retrench and implement the change 
unilaterally.82
                                                 
80  (1998) 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC). 
81  Ss 67, 188 and 189. 
82  Thompson “Bargaining, Business, Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” 
760. 
  Chapter four deals with the test for substantive fairness. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TEST FOR SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 188 of the 1995 LRA lays down the general provision that an employer must 
establish a fair reason to dismiss.  Courts were however reluctant to subject 
employer’s rationale for retrenchment to extensive scrutiny.  The judicial officers 
adopted the view that they were not necessarily the best qualified people to asses 
the merits of business decisions to determine whether they are based on sound 
business or economic principle.  The other reason was that the judicial officers were 
reluctant to allow the fair labour practice jurisdiction to restrict the range of possible 
economic decisions that could be taken by business manager in the genuine belief 
that they were pursuing the best interest of business.83  All that was required of the 
employer was to establish substantive fairness or to demonstrate that it had a bona 
fide reason to retrench.84
Atlantis Diesel Engine
 
 
4.2 THE ROLE OF THE COURT 
 
85
                                                 
83  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 916. 
84  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide at 425. 
85  (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC). 
 the Labour Appeal Court asserted a greater role for courts.  
The court rejected the bona fide, non-discriminatory and commercial justification of 
the decision to retrench as the only reasons that the court must consider in 
determining fairness of retrenchment.  The court recognised that business decision 
could not readily be categorised as correct or incorrect; because some business 
decisions may be considered better than others on a relative scale.   
 
The court held further that termination of employment for economical or operational 
reasons must be a measure of last resort. 
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Thompson86
In South African Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Disctreto
 argues that: 
 
“Testing the fairness of a decision does indeed go further than a cursory look at 
its bona fides and commercial rationale, but it surely cannot go as far as setting 
up the requirement that the termination of employment is the only reasonable 
option in the circumstances.   If the decision is based on a demonstrably sensible 
business analysis that has been probed in the consultative process, is not 
unreasonable in context nor disproportionate in the trade of between gains and 
hardships, it should withstand scrutiny.” 
 
87
The manner in which the court adjudges the latter issue is to enquire whether the 
legal requirements for a proper consultation process had been followed, and if 
so, whether the ultimate decision arrived at by the employer is operationally and 
commercially justifiable on rational grounds, having regard to what emerged from 
the consultation process.  It is important to note that when determining the 
rationality of the employer’s ultimate decision on retrenchment, it is not the 
courts’ function to decide whether it was the best decision under the 
circumstances but only whether it was a rational, commercial or operational 
decision, properly taking into account what emerged during the consultation 
process.”
 the Labour Appeal 
Court’s approach to substantive fairness relied on rationality and it held that the 
question is whether the ultimate decision arrived at by the employer is operationally 
and commercially justified on rational ground, having regard to what emerged from 
the consultation process.  The court described its role as being similar to that of a 
court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action.  In this case the court 
did not follow the approach of Atlantis Diesel Engine. 
 
The court found: 
 
“The function of a court in scrutinising the consultation process is not to second 
guess the commercial or business efficiency of the employer’s ultimate decision 
(an issue on which it is generally not qualified to pronounce upon), but to pass 
judgment on whether the ultimate decision arrived at was genuine and not merely 
a sham (the kind of issue which courts are called upon to do, in a different 
setting, everyday).   
 
88
                                                 
86  Thompson “Bargaining, Business, Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” 
770. 
87  (1998) 12 BLLR 228 (LAC). 
88  Numsa v Atlantis Diesel Engine (1999) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC). 
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In BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v South African Clothing & Textile Workers Union89
In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax
 
the Labour Appeal Court questioned or doubted whether or not the test in SACTWU 
v Discreto was applicable in labour law as it is sourced from the principles of 
administrative review.  The court reaffirmed that the test for dismissal is fairness not 
correctness.   The court went further and suggested that the employer should 
establish that it was necessary to retrench, as opposed to mere accepting the 
employer’s decision at face value.  The court recognised that the starting point is 
whether there is a commercial rational for the employer’s decision, but the court 
emphasised that it was entitled to enquire whether there was a reasonable basis for 
retrenchment.  
 
90
It is the duty of the court to decide whether the dismissal is fair or not.  The employer 
must show that the retrenchment was the last resort.  The courts accepted that 
dismissal for operational requirements need not be restricted to the cutting of costs 
and expenditure. Profit or an increase in profit, or gaining some advantage such as a 
more efficient enterprise can also be an acceptable reason for dismissal for 
operational requirements.
 the Labour Court took the test a 
step further.  The court warned that the judicial officer must guard against accepting 
the merely said so of the employer in regard to the need to retrench.   
 
91
In Hendry v Adcock Ingram,
 
 
92
                                                 
89   (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC). 
90  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
91  Food & Allied Workers Union v Kellogg SA (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ 406 (LC). 
92  (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC). 
 a merger between two companies resulted in the 
dismissal of an employee.  Work of one employee was added to the task of another 
employee as a cost saving exercise.  The Labour Court approved of this reason as a 
fair reason to dismiss for operational requirements.  The court held that fair labour 
practice does not give employees indefinite employment to a particular employer.  
The employer can retrench if it is financially crippled or if a sound economic rational 
is shown. 
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In Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of MetalWorkers of South Africa93
In Enterprise Foods (Pty) Ltd v Allen
 the court 
said the 1995 LRA does not distinguish between operational requirements in the 
context where the business is fighting for survival and operational requirements in the 
case of a profitable business wanting to make even more profit. 
 
94
In Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers
 the shareholder of the company decided to cut 
costs so that they can achieve more profits.  The court confirmed the dismissal on the 
basis of Algorax decision and reasserted Discreto cautious approach that the 
reasonable operations available in the circumstances must be used, but the 
employer must be allowed to exercise managerial prerogative.  
 
95
In Food & Allied Workers Union v South African Breweries Ltd
 the Labour Appeal Court 
accepted that even though the employer had continued to make profits this in itself 
did not preclude a company from retrenching the employees.  Employers have a right 
to retrench if it becomes necessary to be more profitable.   
 
96
The Industrial Court and Labour Court were weary to interfere with the decision of 
employer to retrench.  Courts were of the view that a decision to retrench is a 
business decision that ought to be left in the hand of manager.  In Atlantis Diesel 
Engine the court rejected this approach and said that retrenchment must be based 
on fair reasons and it must be a measure of last resort.  In Algorax the court took the 
test in Atlantis Diesel Engine a step further.  The court warned that the judicial 
 the Labour Court 
held that the employer’s decision to restructure its operations was warranted by 
efficiency considerations and a drive to increase its profitability.   The court found that 
in a market driven economy there could be no objection to an employer retrenching 
to increase its profits, provided that the employer’s conduct remains fair on a general 
assessment of all the evidence. 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
93  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
94  (2004) 25 ILJ 1251 (LAC). 
95  (2004) 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
96  (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC). 
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officers must guard against accepting the mere said so of the employer, but must 
decide whether the dismissal is fair or not.  The Labour Appeal Court confirmed that 
the employers can retrench for making more profit.  Chapter five deals with 
relationship between dismissal for operations requirements and collective bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISMISSAL FOR OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the enactment of the 1995 LRA there was no regulations that governed 
retrenchments that arose as the result of the employer’s purpose to change the way 
that its employees did their work or how they were paid for services that they 
rendered.  Issue relating to conditions of employment between the employer and its 
employees was a matter of negotiations.  If negotiations, regarding conditions of 
employment, fail or reach a deadlock, the employer was generally considered under 
the 1956 LRA to be entitled to introduce the changes unilaterally.  The employee’s 
contract of employment would come to an end.  The employer would issue 
employees with termination notice, or they could be disciplined and ultimately 
dismissed, having continued to tender their services under the new regime, for failing 
or for refusing to work the changed work pattern when it was required. 
 
The employer was required to show that there existed a valid commercial rationale, it 
has negotiated with the employees in good faith and or until negotiations deadlocked 
in the issue and a reasonable notice was issued before the contract of employees 
were terminated.  If all the above requirements were satisfied, that would be found to 
constitute a fair labour practice. 
 
5.2 MEANING AND EFFECT OF SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
It is against the above background that the 1995 LRA was enacted.  The 1995 LRA 
attempted to regulate this situation in a different way, inter alia, by introducing 
automatic unfair dismissal in section 187(1)(c).  The Labour Court has attempted to 
determine the precise meaning and effect of section 187(1)(c) through case law.   
 
The question that the court attempted to address was the right that an employer has 
to dismiss workers for a fair reason relating to operational requirements. 
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In Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd97
The Labour Court held that although the employer is not allowed or prohibited to 
dismiss employees in order to compel them to accept the employer’s demand on 
matters of mutual interest, the employer is not prohibited from resorting to dismissal 
for operational requirements.  The court said “a dismissal for operational 
requirements could be used not only in relation to an employer’s need to change the 
work obligation but also for the remuneration of an employee”.  The court found 
further that the employer was motivated by commercial reasons to make its offer and 
to dismiss the applicant.  The employer was of the bona fide view that the employees 
were not worth the old package of the company.  On this point the court argued that 
this was beyond the scope of adjudication.
 Ms Schoeman and Ms Rossouw 
were sales executives paid a salary package consisting of a basic salary, 
commission and fringe benefits.   As a result of a substantial increase in sales 
volumes that were not related to improvement in their own performance, Ms 
Schoeman and Ms Rossouw began to earn substantially large amounts of 
commission than had been anticipated when the basis for the calculation of 
commission had been agreed.   The employer considered that the amount of the 
commission payments were not justified when the employer considered what the 
company would have to pay in the market to replace them.  After negotiations 
reached impasse, the employer attempted, unsuccessfully to accept a lower basis for 
the calculation of commission.  The employer decided to embark on retrenchment 
consultations and ultimately dismissed both employees. 
 
98
The judgment of Schoeman v Samsung was heavily criticised by authors such as 
Thompson.  Thompson in article sets out how the prohibition on the use of dismissal 
as weapon in collective bargaining was to be reconciled with the operational 
requirements dismissal.  He attempted to establish the principle that may be used to 
 
 
5.3 MIGRATION 
 
                                                 
97  (1999) 20 ILJ 200 (LC). 
98  Thompson “Bargaining, Business, Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” 
755. 
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determine how the engagement between management and labour could migrate 
from the arena of collective bargaining to the arena of dismissal.   Thompson argued 
that the world of work and business defies sharp categorisation and the 1995 LRA 
appeared to pursue competing policy objectives in successive breaths.  He pointed 
out two areas of interaction between labour and management.  “When the contest 
between management and labour is purely over the wage work bargaining in other 
words, the substantive term of the next collective agreement dismissal will never 
permissible, the ‘for profit termination’ offends against section (1)(c).  An employer 
may argue, however, that not a quest for profit but sheer operational requirements 
obliged a particular economic outcome, even to the point of sanctioning the 
discharge of those who hold out.  But the Labour Court should learn against a result 
that allows a dispute on a wage work deal to escape the protected zone of collective 
bargaining.  When in exceptional circumstances the case for migration is made, the 
employer must still overcome a formidable fairness hurdle in the judicial process.”99
Todd and Damant
 
 
Thompson is of the view that an exchange over employment changes driven by 
operational requirements does not fit well within the conventional bargaining frame 
work.  He states that this is because the wage profit split is not directly at stake and 
precipitating factors are often beyond the partners’ control.  He argues further that 
business restructuring fits better in section 189 of the 1995 LRA. 
 
100
                                                 
99  (2004) 25 ILJ 1979 (LC). 
100  Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 200 (LC) at para 20. 
 differ with Thompson as far as the existence of distinction 
between the subject matter of engagement between labour and management over 
classic mutual interest disputes and those disputes that constitute the employer’s 
sheer operational requirement.  They differ again on the maintenance of conceptual 
distinction between the process of collective bargaining and the process of 
consultation that is envisaged in section 189 of the 1995 LRA. 
 
Todd and Damant argue that it is artificial to talk of migration of engagement form the 
arena of bargaining to the arena of dismissal, because there can be no conceptual 
distinction that can be properly drawn between matters of mutual interest and matters 
that cause employers to contemplate retrenchment.   
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Both disputes impact ultimately on wage work bargaining and should be discussed in 
the same process of engagement between management and labour.  They accept 
Thompson’s view that states that the debate over the operational requirement of a 
business is essentially an economic one, not a legal one, and that the debate should 
therefore, begin in the bargaining arena.101
There is not distinction that can be drawn between the process that is followed in 
consultation and bargaining process.  Both processes require information sharing on 
good faith commitment to reach outcome or solutions, consensus, or agreement in 
relation to the subject matter of bargaining.  There is no greater duty to compromise 
in bargaining than is required in consultation.   There is no added compulsion or 
incentive to reach agreement merely because the process of engagement is styled 
bargaining or negotiation rather than consultation.  The court in National Union of 
Metal Workers of South Africa v Atlantis Diesel Engine
 
 
Todd and Damant argue further that there is no proper distinction that can be drawn 
between matters that are in a pure sense the subject of the wage work deal and the 
employer’s operational requirements.  Wage work bargaining matters can form 
alternative to retrenchment during the consultations for operational requirements.  
They referred to the litigation in both Fry’s Metals and Algorax, where employers 
wanted to introduce change to existing shift systems.   The reason for the proposed 
change was the alteration of production system and demand, to the pursuit of 
improved efficiency and better achievements of its profit objectives.  The reasons 
advanced by the employer relates to operational requirements.  But hours of work, 
payment for those hours and working conditions that go with the employer’s 
operational requirements are matters of mutual interest.  There is obvious overlap 
between operational requirements and wage work bargaining.  There is no reason for 
conceptual distinction between the matters which form the subject of engagement in 
negotiations over conditions of service and typical retrenchment consultation. 
 
102
                                                 
101  Thompson “Bargaining, Business, Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” 
755. 
102  (1992) 13 ILJ 405 (IC). 
 rejected the notion that 
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retrenchment consultations merely present an opportunity for workers or their 
representatives to make representations. 
 
5.4  MEANING OF SECTION 187(1)(c) 
  
Section 187(1)(c) does not purport to prohibit a dismissal where a reason for the 
dismissal is the failure of employees to accept a change to their conditions of 
employment.  This section does not prohibit threat of dismissal as a means of 
persuasion in the collective bargaining process.  This section prohibits a dismissal 
where the reason for the dismissal is to compel employees to accept a collective 
bargaining demand which may, it seems, be calculated to induce (through force of 
argument)  acceptance of a demand, but nevertheless fall short of an attempt to 
compel that acceptance.103
                                                 
103  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 916. 
 
 
The line is crossed when a party in the collective bargaining process attempts to 
compel acceptance of a demand that involves some action designed to force the 
other party’s hand.   
 
The action that goes beyond persuasion is lock-out or dismissal.  An employer whose 
motive is to persuade its employee to accept his demand may not use dismissal to 
achieve his objective.  Section 187(1)(c) prohibits the use of dismissal in the 
circumstance.    
 
On the other hand, an employer that requires its employees to work according to a 
new shift pattern for rational and justifiable operational reasons and is willing to get 
rid of its existing workforce in favour of a new workforce may dismiss if this satisfies 
the test for operational requirements dismissal.  The dismissal must be operationally 
and commercially justifiable on rational grounds. 
 
The purpose of section 187(1)(c) was to end the debate of lock-out dismissal and to 
prohibit dismissals that are intended to force employees to accept demands of 
employers. 
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To deal with conceptual discomfort, the Labour Appeal Court was constrained in 
Fry’s Metals to describe the section 187(1)(c) dismissal as one distinction from 
dismissal which that section 186 refers to.  It is a special kind of dismissal. 
 
In Fry’s Metals, the employer made it clear to its employees that if they fail to signify 
their acceptance of the proposed new shift system by a particular dated, their 
contract would be terminated.  Many efforts were made to stress the importance of 
deadline, but once it had passed the employer acted decisively.  Employees were 
dismissed finally, with no prospects of being re-engaged if they later changed their 
minds.  This meant that the dismissal did not violate the section 187(1)(c) prohibition. 
 
In Algorax, by contrast the employer went an extra mile to persuade employees to 
accept its proposed new shift configuration.  The deadline was extended repeatedly.  
Employees were requested to reconsider their position.  After employees are 
dismissed, Algorax repeated its offer to re-employ those that were dismissed if they 
indicated their willingness to return on the new conditions.   
 
This meant that the dismissal of the employees was tantamount to lock-out dismissal 
and in contravention of section 187(1)(c).  The employers conduct was said to be 
automatically unfair.  The employees were reinstated into the old shift system with 
several years of back pay. 
 
The effect of prohibiting the lock-out dismissal is to signal to employers that the 
decision to dismiss may be taken only at the point at which it is clear that no form of 
persuasion is likely to induce the workers to change their minds and accept the 
employers new shift system or terms.  At that point the employer must take a firm 
stand against those workers who continue to reject the required change.  The 
decision must be commercially rational.  It must be defensible on the ordinary test for 
the substantive fairness of operational requirements dismissal.  Chapter six deals 
with conclusions and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
 
Employers are often faced with economic reasons that require them to review their 
staffing levels, or to terminate the employment of some their employees.  Economic 
reasons may be influenced by competitive market forces or the employer may want 
to better achievements of its profit objective.  Under these circumstances the 
employer would normally invite its employee or their representative to discuss the 
problem that is facing the company and the implications thereof.   
 
In terms of section 64104
At this point a question of conflict arises.  The courts are faced with a difficulty of 
weighing the interests of employees to social security
 the employer is not allowed to unilaterally introduce a 
change to terms and conditions of employment of employee.  The consent of 
employee has to be obtained.  The employer is forced to initiate negotiations with its 
employees or their representatives if the employer wishes to introduce any change.  
This is the beginning of collective bargaining process.  If negotiations reach a point of 
impasse, the employer has legal remedies.   
 
The employer can choose to embark on an offensive lock-out or a defensive local 
out, or retrenchment exercise.  On the other hand the employees have a right to call 
for a legal strike, refuse to agree to the change of their contract and hold the 
employer to the contract., in terms of section 41(4) of the BCEA, or in terms of other 
comparable provisions that my be contained in the employers policies or applicable 
collective agreement. 
 
105
                                                 
104  1995 Labour Relations Act. 
105  S 1 of 1995 Labour Relations Act. 
 and the interests of 
employers to economic contract.  How does the law conceive of the contests, what 
measures may the parties legitimately take in an attempt to impose their will?  Is 
 40 
dismissal a legitimate instrument to coerce the employees to accept the employers 
demand in the collective bargaining process?106
Dismissal is not permitted in disputes that concern matters of mutual interest.  
Dismissal is not a legitimate instrument of coercion in the collective bargaining 
process.
 
 
107
In contrast, employers are allowed to dismiss employees who refuse to agree to 
change to their conditions of employment on the ground of operational requirements, 
provided a fair procedure is followed.
  Under the 1956 LRA, employers were permitted to discuss employees 
(temporary) in order to compel them to accept a demand.  Lock-out dismissals had to 
be coupled with a condition of re-employment at the point of the employee 
acceptance to the demand of the employer.  Section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 LRA was 
enacted to end the existence of lock-out dismissal.  In terms of this section the 
dismissal becomes automatically unfair if it is intended to compel employees to 
accept a demand.  Lock-out under the 1995 LRA allows the employer to exclude 
employees from its premises or production area in an attempt to compel them to 
accede to a demand.  This kind of lock-out falls short of dismissal.   
 
108
Todd and Damant call this overlap the relationship between dismissal for operations 
requirements and collective bargaining.
  Change to the conditions of employment 
discussed under the banner of collective bargaining, is regarded as a mutual interest 
matter.   
 
If the change is discussed, in consultation, for operational reasons, the matter or 
dispute is of right.  It is at this point that an overlap between section 187(1)(c) and 
dismissal based on operational requirements starts.   
 
109  The Labour Appeal Court110
                                                 
106  Thompson “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres of the Fry’s 
Metals” (2006) 27 ILJ 704. 
107  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd at para. 38. 
108  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
109  Todd and Damant “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 910. 
110  Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
 and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal have held that the only dismissal that section 187(1)(c) 
targeted was lock-out dismissal.  The legislature intended to end the debate about 
lock-out dismissal.   
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Dismissal must be final and it must not be coupled with any condition of re-
employment.  Section 187(1)(c) was intended to prohibit conditional dismissal in an 
attempt to compel employees to accept a demand.  Dismissal must be irrevocable 
and final with no prospects of re-employment.  Conditional dismissal or dismissal that 
is not final is tantamount to lock-out dismissal, and it contravenes section 187(1)(c). 
 
In Chemical Industrial Workers Union v Algorax111
Todd and Damant
 the Labour Appeal Court found the 
dismissal to be unfair, dispute concession that the employer had a valid operational 
requirement to dismiss.  The dismissal was declared unfair because Algorax offered 
to re-employ the dismissed employees even after the so called final dismissal.  The 
court held that the actions of the employer constitute lock-out dismissal and are in 
conflict with section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 LRA. 
 
112
Todd and Damant
 argue that, there is no need for conceptualisation.  “Migration” 
from the arena of collective bargaining to the arena of dismissal does not exist.  
Consultation over retrenchment and negotiation in collective bargaining require some 
information sharing and good faith commitment jointly to reach outcomes of 
solutions, consensus or agreement in relation to the subject matter of bargaining.    
 
The potential alternatives and different permutations may be put on the same table.  
They argue further that if the argument is accepted, then the provisions of section 
187(1)(c) of the LRA would make no sense if they prohibited the kind of dismissal 
that took place in Fry’s Metals. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.2.1 REINSTATE LOCK-OUT DISMISSAL 
 
113
                                                 
111  (2003) 24 ILJ 1977 (LAC). 
112  “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 915. 
113  “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 919. 
 argue that lock-out dismissal is preferable by a big margin to 
final dismissal.  Lock-out dismissal might have been an attempt to prevent employers 
from circumventing the prohibition on the employment of replacement labour in the 
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employer’s initial lock-outs.  This does not help employees because employers could 
dismiss employees and employ scab labour while ultimately hoping to compel the 
dismissed workers to accede to its demand.   
 
This situation can be saved by lock-out dismissal.  Lock-out dismissal would make it 
difficult for employers to dismiss before they have exhausted attempts at reaching 
the point of resolving the dispute through industrial action.   
 
The employer will only argue dismissal once it has reached the point in collective 
bargaining process when its operational requirements justify total replacement of 
workforce, with all the costs and convenience that this exercise go with. 
 
6.2.2 REMOVAL OF SECTION 187(1)(c) FROM THE CATEGORY OF 
AUTOMATICALLY UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
 
Thompson114
Todd and Damant
 suggests that section 187(1)(c) should be removed from the category 
of automatically unfair dismissals.  He argues: 
 
“Option one could be to remove the prohibition of tactical and temporary 
dismissals from the category of automatically unfair dismissal.  It simply does not 
belong there and spawns anomalies.  In fact, it probably does not belong 
anywhere else either.  The shoulders of section (1)(a)(ii) are broad enough to 
deal with fairness of all dismissals in the operational requirements context, and 
strong enough to give all dismissals that subvert the bargaining process, whether 
temporary or permanent, their proper due.” 
 
115
                                                 
114  Thompson “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres of the Fry’s 
Metals” 730. 
115  “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements” 916. 
 suggest that, if their opinion that no conceptual distinction can 
properly be drawn between the subject matter of collective bargaining and the 
subject matter of retrenchment consultation is correct, and that no proper distinction 
can be maintained between the processes required to be followed, then the 
provisions of section 187(1)(c) of the LRA would make no sense if they prohibited the 
kind of dismissal that took place in Fry’s Metals.  The distinction between what is and 
what is not permissible would become difficult if not impossible to draw.   
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Interpreted broadly, the section 187(1)(c) prohibition would make very far reaching 
inroads into the employer’s ability to use retrenchment to effect workplace 
restructuring.   
 
6.2.3 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
Roskam116
(c) the employee’s refusal to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee." 
 suggests and recommends the amendment of section 187(1)(c) of the 
LRA.  He argues that collective bargaining has always been the preferred 
mechanism for resolving disputes about wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment.  It is imperative that the sanctity of collective bargaining be protected. 
 
Roskam further suggests that section 187(1)(c) be read as follows after it is 
amended: 
 
“A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 5 or if the reason for the dismissal is - 
 
 
6.2.4 USE OF “CAUSATION” TEST 
 
Cohen117
                                                 
116  An Exploratory Look into Labour Market Regulation (2006) 45. 
117  “Dismissal to Force Changes to Terms and Conditions of Employment – Automatically Unfair or 
Operationally Justifiable” (2004) 25 ILJ 1883. 
 argues for the use of causation test in examining within the context of 
proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment.  Whether dismissal is 
based on operational requirements or is aimed at compelling employees to accede to 
an employer demand.   
 
In South African Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd the court used causation test.  
Employees were dismissed while they were on strike.  The question that was before 
the court was whether the employees were dismissed because of their participation 
in the strike action or the dismissal was for genuine operational requirements.  The 
court concluded that the employees were dismissed for operational requirements. 
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Causation test consists of factual causation and legal causation. 
 
6.3 FACTUAL CAUSATION 
 
The test is whether the employees would have been dismissed if the employer had 
not attempted to introduce changes to their terms and conditions of employment.  If 
the answer is that the dismissal would have taken place even if the employer had not 
proposed changes to the terms and conditions of employment, the dismissal would 
not be automatically unfair.  If the answer to the same question is negative (no), this 
does not render the dismissal automatically unfair.  The next step of enquiry of 
causation test kicks in; that is legal causation. 
 
6.4 LEGAL CAUSATION 
 
The enquiry is whether the proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment 
were the main or dominant reason behind the dismissal.  If it cannot be inferred that 
the dismissal was intended to compel employees to accept the employer’s demand, 
the next stage should be to bring section 189 so as to ascertain whether the 
dismissal was effected for a fair reason based on operational requirements, and 
whether a fair procedure was followed or not. 
 
Looking at the above conclusion and recommendation, the question that still needs to 
be answered is whether section 187(1)(c) is still relevant after Fry’s Metals judgment. 
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